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POSITIVE PROPOSALS FOR TREATMENT OF 
ONLINE INTERMEDIARIES 
 
Margot Kaminski
1
   
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In the past several years of free trade agreement negotiations, a number of 
proposals for establishing an international standard of liability for copyright 
infringement by online intermediaries have emerged.  These proposals 
consistently lack consideration of their implications for Internet users. 
Building off a public stakeholder presentation given by the author at the 
ninth round of negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
Agreement, held in Lima, Peru, this paper aims to identify both general 
principles and specific user-protecting provisions that should be considered 
when discussing proposals for intermediary liability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the past several years of free trade agreement negotiations, a number 
of proposals for establishing an international standard of liability for 
copyright infringement by online intermediaries have emerged.
2
 These 
proposals consistently lack consideration of their implications for Internet 
users. Building off a public stakeholder presentation given by the author at 
the ninth round of negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
Agreement, held in Lima, Peru, this paper aims to identify both general 
                                                 
2
 Discussions of intermediary liability have arisen in negotiations for the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) and in the ongoing Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPP) negotiation rounds. See Margot E. Kaminski, An Overview and the 
Evolution of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 385 
(2011); Margot Kaminski, Plurilateral Agreements Lack Protections for Users, 
Intermediaries, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Oct. 27, 2011, http://www.ip-
watch.org/2011/10/27/plurilateral-trade-agreements-lack-protections-for-users-
intermediaries/. 
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principles and specific user-protecting provisions that should be considered 
when discussing proposals for intermediary liability. 
 
II. THE PROBLEMS RAISED BY INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY 
 
This section provides a brief overview of the problems inherent in 
establishing liability for online intermediaries.
3
 
Online intermediaries host a vast variety of content provided by Internet 
users. In fact, all online communication passes through an intermediary of 
some sort, whether it is an Internet Service Provider (ISP), such as Comcast, 
or a platform, such as Google or Facebook. Intermediary behavior directly 
affects users’ freedom of expression, privacy, and their ability to innovate. 
An intermediary may also choose to monitor users’ behavior,  to take down 
user-created content, or to prevent the construction of new technology on 
the platform it provides. An ISP may undertake these actions independently 
or at the request of a government.  
When a government establishes legal liability for intermediaries, it 
affects these behaviors and, thus, affects Internet users. For example, 
making an online platform liable for defamation by its users will likely 
cause the intermediary to take down a large number of user comments, out 
of caution. Similarly, making an email-hosting service liable for the content 
of a user’s email would cause that intermediary to monitor the content of 
the user’s inbox, to make sure nothing potentially damaging is being sent or 
received. Finally, making a smart phone provider liable for legal problems 
with third-party applications built on its operating system would make that 
intermediary more likely to reject new technologies. 
None of these actions stem from malice on the part of the intermediary. 
They come from a company’s reasonable caution, in the light of potential 
damages or criminal punishment. In other words, Yahoo’s lawyers will look 
at the intermediary liability system set up by a government; calculate the 
risk Yahoo faces with its current policies, taking intermediary liability laws 
into account; and give advice to their client that is sound and cautious—but 
that greatly influences users’ ability to use Yahoo to communicate. 
Consequently, governments need to be particularly careful when 
establishing systems of intermediary liability. When a company faces the 
                                                 
3
 Thanks to Matthew Zimmerman at the Electronic Frontier Foundation for his helpful 
slide presentation; Mathew Zimmerman, Presentation, Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Stakeholder Forum, at Santiago, Chile: ―EFF Presentation on Freedom of Expression, 
Indirect Censorship & Liability for Internet Intermediaries‖ (Feb.15, 2011) [hereinafter 
EFF Presentation], available at https://www.eff.org/issues/tpp (follow ―EFF Presentation 
on Freedom of Expression, Indirect Censorship & Liability for Internet Intermediaries‖ 
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prospect of intermediary liability, it is unlikely that users’ interests will be 
its primary focus. The company may consider potential market backlash to 
its reaction to intermediary liability laws, however, if the liability exposure 
is great enough, long-term user preferences will often take the backseat to 
avoiding an immediate lawsuit. 
In summary, intermediary liability can cause intermediaries to prevent 
content from being posted in the first place, take down legitimate content,
4
 
choke innovative new technology built on their platforms, or perform 
surveillance on users; these measures generally undercut user privacy and 
freedom of expression. 
There is also a public choice problem.
5
 The highest stakeholders in 
intermediary liability—the potential plaintiff and the potential defendant—
have greater incentive to craft liability laws than Internet users, whose 
interests are diffuse and who face higher organizational costs. Governments 
must, therefore, be especially attentive to including protections for the 
general public when considering intermediary liability legislation. 
Recognizing that intermediaries’ interests are not perfectly aligned with 
user interests, this paper aims to identify the kinds of user protections that 
governments should be sure to include in intermediary liability regimes. 
 
III. WHAT INTERMEDIARIES CAN BE TOLD TO DO –OR NOT TO DO 
 
Governments have a number of choices for how to treat online 
intermediaries. They can go after the intermediary directly, by making it 
criminally liable for user behavior.
6
 They can make the intermediary civilly 
liable to other private parties for monetary damages.
7
 They can directly 
require the intermediary to monitor user behavior, or indirectly create 
incentives to monitor users, through the implementation of a liability 
regime. They can encourage an intermediary to take down material, as part 
of a notice-and-takedown regime,
8
 or require an intermediary to cut off a 
user’s Internet access.9 
                                                                                                                            
hyperlink). 
4
 See generally CHILLING EFFECTS, http://www.chillingeffects.org/ (last visited Feb. 
21, 2012) (cataloguing cease and assist notices). 
5
 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 13–16 (2004). 
6
 Rachel Donadio, Italy Convicts Three Google Officials in Privacy Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 25, 2010, at A1. 
7
 See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
8
 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1998). 
9
 One example of such a regime is the French HADOPI law, a graduated response 
system that terminates user Internet access after three strikes.  See French Downloaders 
Face Government Grilling, BBC, July 27, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
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The United States operates under a system of notice-and-takedown.  The 
United States limits intermediary liability, provided that the intermediary 
takes down infringing material when it has been notified of it and replaces 
material in response to  claims that it is not, in fact, infringing.
10
 The Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), the statutory authority for 
intermediary liability in the United States, falls under civil law, not criminal 
law, and depends on the presumption that intermediaries are liable for user 
behavior in the first place. It is also worth noting, as I discuss briefly in the 
next section, that the DMCA addresses copyright only; in the United States 
intermediaries are not liable for user defamation or other actions. The 
DMCA recognizes a variety of intermediaries, including both platforms and 
pipes, and treats them differently based on how much control the 
intermediary can (and does) exercise over the content passing through it.  
For example, neutral, noninterfering pipes (such as the fiber networks that 
form the backbone of the Internet in the United States) do not have to 
comply with the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown provisions. 
International law is fairly silent about intermediary liability, but it is 
unlikely to remain so for long. Earlier international trade treaties did not 
address intermediary liability.  For example, the 1996 Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Law (TRIPS Agreement) does not 
contain provisions concerning digital enforcement. This began to change 
with the adoption of the World Intellectual Property Rights Organization 
(WIPO) Copyright Treaty, which contains language on technological 
protection measures,
11
 but none on intermediary liability regimes. The EU 
addresses intermediary liability in the E-Commerce Directive,
12
 but lacks 
EU-wide criminal intermediary liability, because there is no EU-wide 
criminalization of copyright infringement.
13
 If ACTA is ratified by the 
European Parliament, this will change.
14
 In the meantime, the United States 
has spread notice-and-takedown requirements to a number of countries 
through a series of bilateral free trade agreements
15
 and appears to be trying 
                                                                                                                            
14294517. 
10
 17 U.S.C. § 512. 
11
 WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 11, 12, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-
17, 36 I.L.M. 65. 
12
 Council Directive 2000/31/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EC) [hereinafter E-Commerce 
Directive]. 
13
 See Official Journal C 252, EUR-LEX, (Sept. 18, 2010) http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:252:SOM:EN:HTML (implying that the 
European Commission decided to withdraw the proposal for an EU-wide criminal 
copyright law directive).  
14
 Kaminski, An Overview and the Evolution of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement, supra note 1, at 409. 
15
 Susan K. Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti–Counterfeiting and Piracy 
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to accomplish the same end through the TPP.
16
 
 
IV. FLEXIBILITY FOR INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES: SOVEREIGNTY AND 
EXPERIMENTATION 
 
Although the United States has been pushing for greater copyright 
protections in international law, it is not clear that cementing an 
international standard on intermediary liability is the right move at this 
time. Waiting to establish a standard based on principles, rather than 
specific requirements, would better respect the sovereignty of individual 
countries to choose whether to implement intermediary liability and would 
afford countries flexibility for experimentation with different liability 
regimes, to see what policies work best in the long-run. The Internet has not 
been around for very long and prematurely standardizing one regime 
internationally will freeze experimentation.  The effort to establish a single 
regime also assumes, incorrectly, that the international community shares 
one homogeneous understanding of the role of online intermediaries. 
It cannot be assumed that intermediaries should always be liable for user 
behavior. The experience of the United States sheds light on the 
complications inherent in establishing intermediary liability. Before the 
enactment of the Communications Decency Act (CDA), U.S. courts went 
back and forth over whether an online intermediary was liable for 
defamation, as a publisher would be,
17
 or free from liability, like a 
distributor.
18
 The United States currently uses a statute to excuse online 
intermediaries from liability for defamatory statements made by users.
19
 
However, courts have recognized a number of exceptions to this broad 
waiver of liability for online intermediaries. Intermediaries may be held 
liable if they encourage certain violations of the law; for example, the Ninth 
Circuit held that an intermediary could be held liable for providing a drop-
down menu of discriminatory categories for users to select from when 
searching for roommates, a practice which violates the Fair Housing Act.
20
 
In the copyright context, a series of U.S. court cases recognize secondary 
                                                                                                                            
Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play. (Program on Info. Just. Intell. Prop. Res. Paper 
Series, Paper No.  NO. 15, 2010), AM. U. WASH. C. OF LAW (Oct. 2010), available at  
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/research/15/ 
16
 Sean Flynn et al., Public Interest Analysis of the US TPP Proposal for an IP 
Chapter, (Program on Info. Just. Intell. Prop. Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 21, 2011) 
available at http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/research/21. 
17
 Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). 
18
 Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
19
 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
20
 Fair Housing Council v. Roommate.com, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
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liability for contributory or vicarious copyright infringement
21
 and the 
Supreme Court recognized intermediary liability for inducement of 
copyright infringement.
22
 These exceptions to the general waiver of 
liability, as well as the concurrent ideas of secondary liability and 
inducement, took over two decades to gain traction and become established 
law. 
It is, thus, not a given that intermediaries are always liable for user 
behavior. U.S. courts continue to struggle with determining when an 
intermediary might be liable. Statutes and treaties that create ―safe harbors‖ 
for intermediaries internationally are based on an implicit and unfounded 
assumption that law in different countries universally recognizes that 
intermediaries should be held liable for user behavior. This is a tenuous 
position. 
Where intermediary liability does exist, there are legitimate reasons for 
crafting limitations on that liability. It may, in fact, make sense to 
standardize safe harbors, to prevent overzealous content regulation and 
privacy violations. The Internet is international and online providers such as 
Facebook operate internationally. It would be less costly to have one 
standard set of rules, under which companies can operate knowing that they 
are in compliance with a number of countries’ laws, rather than forcing 
those companies to adjust their behavior for every jurisdiction. The 
potential benefits of standardization are many: lower transaction costs, in 
the form of compliance checks, and greater willingness to expand into 
markets that share the standardized rules, among others.
23
  However, it is 
very important that any standardized regime comprise a balanced set of 
rules that protect the interests of all of the parties affected by them, as 
discussed below. 
  
V. RECENT TRENDS IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 
 
A number of trends concerning online intermediaries can be identified 
in the recent proposals for free trade agreements, such as ACTA and TPP. 
One troubling trend is the imposition of criminal liability on intermediaries 
for users’ copyright infringement.24 Another trend consists of encouraging 
                                                 
21
 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
22
 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
23
 JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIAL AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 36 (2d ed. 1986) 
(suggesting that transaction costs could be ―minimized or eliminated if customs and 
practices could be standardized and made uniform throughout the world‖). 
24
 Kaminski, supra note 13. 
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businesses to make private deals with each other.
25
 An example of this took 
place in the United States when a number of ISPs entered into a 
memorandum of understanding with content producers, agreeing to send 
warning notices to potentially infringing users, followed by ―mitigation 
measures‖ that may include reductions of Internet speeds, redirection to a 
landing page, or other measures.
26
 This privatized system amplifies the 
public choice and due process problems for users, who have no voice in the 
negotiations of private agreements and little to no say in whatever takedown 
process companies establish. 
In negotiations for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, some 
countries pushed to establish ―graduated response.‖27 Graduated response 
refers to an incremental enforcement system, whereby intermediaries 
monitor users’ content for copyright-infringing works, send infringing users 
notices and warnings, and eventually deny them access to the 
intermediaries’ systems, if the infringement continues unabated. In the 
ACTA negotiations, the proposal to include graduated response failed, as a 
result of strong public opposition; it has not yet resurfaced in the TPP 
negotiations. The U.S. proposal for digital enforcement in free trade 
agreements appears to resemble the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s 
system of notice-and-takedown. But, as I have discussed briefly elsewhere
28
 
and will discuss below, the current proposals lack significant protections for 
users. 
VI. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
 
This section outlines the general principles that countries should keep in 
mind when negotiating intermediary liability.
29
 I outline the following 
general principles in no particular order. Although they are interrelated, 
most can be adopted independently of one another. 
 
1. Be clear that provision of the safe harbors does not, in 
itself, establish intermediary liability. In the DMCA, 
                                                 
25
 Id. at 393.  See also Annemarie Bridy, ACTA and the Specter of Graduated 
Response (Program on Info. Just. Intell. Prop. Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 2, 2010), 
available at http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/research/2. 
26
 See Frequently Asked Questions, CENTER FOR COPYRIGHT INFORMATION (Feb. 21, 
2012, 4:11 PM), http://www.copyrightinformation.org/faq. 
27
 See David Kravets, ACTA Backs Away from 3 Strikes, WIRED MAGAZINE, Apr. 21, 
2010, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/04/acta-treaty/. 
28
 Margot Kaminski, Plurilateral Agreements Lack Protections for Users, 
Intermediaries, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Oct. 27, 2011, http://www.ip-
watch.org/2011/10/27/plurilateral-trade-agreements-lack-protections-for-users-
intermediaries/. 
29
 See EFF Presentation, supra note 2. 
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Section 512(1) clarifies that compliance with notice-and-
takedown does not affect the intermediary’s ability to claim 
that its behavior is not, in the first instance, infringing. 
2. To protect user privacy, be clear about not establishing 
a duty to monitor user activity. As discussed above, 
liability incentivizes intermediaries to monitor user activity. 
Governments must make a clear statement that this 
behavior is not required, and could in fact add language 
prohibiting monitoring more generally In the United States, 
the DMCA clarifies that liability safe harbors are not 
conditioned on intermediaries monitoring services, except 
to the extent consistent with a ―standard technical 
measure.‖30 In the EU, the E-Commerce Directive, more 
broadly, prevents member states from imposing on 
intermediaries a general obligation to monitor information 
that they transmit or store, regardless of their compliance 
with safe harbors.
31
 
3. Be careful in the expansiveness of your definition of 
infringement. An overly expansive definition of copyright 
infringement, such as one that includes temporary copies, 
may make intermediaries liable for direct infringement, 
rather than secondary infringement. It also broadens 
liability for user-created content, because more of that user-
created content will be considered infringing. 
4. Be extremely cautious in implementing statutory 
damages. Statutory, or ―pre-established,‖ damages 
establish huge financial penalties for copyright 
infringement, with no proof of actual damage required.
32
 
Aside from the risks that statutory damages create for users 
themselves, statutory damages incentivize intermediaries to 
take more material down, because the possible monetary 
loss they face is much higher. 
5. Avoid establishing criminal liability for third parties.  
Criminal liability, or enforcement by the government, 
rather than private actors, is a new idea in discussions of 
intermediary liability. The United States does not address 
criminal liability for third parties for criminal copyright 
infringement by users in any statute
33
 and U.S. caselaw 
does not yet address it.
34
 The danger of establishing 
                                                 
30
 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(2) (1998). 
31
 E-Commerce Directive, supra note 11, at art. 12–14. 
32
 Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A 
Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 441 (2009) (explaining that the 
U.S. is ―an outlier in the global copyright community in giving plaintiffs in copyright cases 
the ability to elect, at any time before final judgment‖). 
33
 18 U.S.C. §§ 2319, 2320 (2008); 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1998). 
34
 See David Robinson, Following the Money: A Better Way Forward on the 
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criminal liability for third parties is that, in the absence of 
clear standards on willfulness or inducement, criminal 
liability establishes a shadow system of liability. Even if a 
company complies with civil safe harbor provisions, it may 
still be criminally liable. Thus, civil safe harbors will not 
prevent intermediaries from behaving in self-protective 
ways; these behaviors will persist, in order to avoid 
criminal liability. 
6. Do not require intermediaries to terminate user 
Internet accounts in response to copyright infringement 
claims, in the absence of court oversight. The Internet 
has become the primary mode of communication and 
socialization for most people. Account termination is a 
disproportionate remedy for copyright infringement; it 
threatens that individual’s right of free expression and 
ability to participate in many aspects of modern life. In 
evaluating an earlier version of France’s graduated 
response law, the French Constitutional Court found that 
the law undercut free speech and the presumption of 
innocence; the court, therefore, established that 
enforcement of the law required court oversight.
35
 
7. Be sure to establish due process for users. The most 
dangerous part of establishing intermediary liability safe 
harbors, such as the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown 
provisions, is that the procedures often take place outside of 
the judicial system. A content owner can request a 
takedown of material, which may remain down for a 
significant amount of time, even if it is ultimately not 
infringing.
36
 There are ways to better protect due process: 
Chile, for example, uses courts to determine whether 
material is infringing before intermediaries must take it 
down.
37
 
8. Give users the procedural ability to protest/sanction 
bad behavior.  This principle is related to the due process 
concern. Just as countries should make sure that there is 
enough court oversight for claims of infringement, in order 
                                                                                                                            
PROTECT IP Act (Info. Soc’y Project, Working Paper No. 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.law.yale.edu/intellectuallife/6564.htm (follow ―Following the Money: A Better 
Way Forward on the Protect IP Act‖ hyperlink; then ―One-Click Download‖ hyperlink). 
35
 See Peggy Hollinger, French Anti-Piracy Drive Ruled Illegal, FIN. TIMES, June 11, 
2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/986d8406-5620-11de-ab7e-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz1mVyD6zKI. 
36
 Cf. Declan McCullagh, DHS abruptly abandons copyright seizure of hip-hop blog, 
CNET, Dec. 8, 2011, http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-57339569-281/dhs-abruptly-
abandons-copyright-seizure-of-hip-hop-blog/. 
37
 Information for Chile, GLOBAL CENSORSHIP CHOKEPOINTS (Feb. 21, 2012, 2:21 
PM), https://globalchokepoints.org/countries/chile. 
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to allow users to protect their own rights, they can and 
should empower users to monitor the system in their own 
interest. One example is allowing users to sue overeager 
content-owners, who deliberately claim infringement where 
they know none exists, as is present in the DMCA Section 
512(f).
38
  
9. Leave flexibility for countries to experiment with 
broader user protections. While intermediary safe harbors 
are good, any international agreement should leave 
flexibility for countries to establish systems that are more 
protective of users, such as Canada’s notice-and-notice 
system
39
 or Chile’s decision to involve its court system in 
determining whether material is, in fact, infringing.
40
 
10. Include limitations and exceptions to the liability rules, 
such as fair use. In the United States, the doctrine of ―fair 
use‖ allows individuals to use portions of a copyrighted 
work for selected academic purposes or for other selected 
applications, such as parody, without a license.
41
  Fair use 
is an affirmative defense to claims of copyright 
infringement and is crucial to protecting users’ abilities to 
innovate using copyrighted works. In ACTA, there was no 
mention of fair use or limitations and exceptions, apart 
from the section on technological protection measures; in 
this section, ACTA permits parties to adopt or maintain 
appropriate limitations or exceptions to the implementation 
of technological protection measures.
42
 
 
Many developing countries fail to implement the full scope of 
limitations and exceptions.
43
 When negotiating free trade agreements, these 
countries must be sure to include explicit mention of exceptions and 
limitations, or these protections likely will not make it into domestic law 
and intermediaries will, consequently, be left liable for more types of user 
behavior. 
 
 
 
                                                 
38
 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2010). 
39
 Canada Copyright Modernization Act, Bill C-11, 41st Parliament § 47. 
40
 See supra note 37. 
41
 See Frequently Asked Questions about Electronic Frontier Foundation, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 21, 2012, 2:32 PM), http://w2.eff.org/IP/eff_fair_use_faq.php. 
42
 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Dec. 3, 2010, Sec. 5., art. 2.18.8, p. 17. 
43
 CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE 
GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 203 
(2008). 
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VII. BALANCING PROVISIONS FOR NOTICE-AND-TAKEDOWN REGIMES 
  
It is not clear that notice-and-takedown should become the international 
standard. However, if it is going to be considered, there are important 
balancing mechanisms that should be included to protect Internet users. 
This section explores in greater detail the types of balancing provisions that 
should be included in free trade agreements if they are to include notice-
and-takedown regimes. 
 
A. Notify users when material is taken down. 
 
Users should be notified when their content is taken down. Otherwise, 
their speech rights will be threatened, without giving them an opportunity to 
respond. In U.S. law, the intermediary is incentivized to take reasonable 
steps to ―promptly‖ notify users when it has removed material; otherwise, 
the intermediary can be liable to users for taking material down.
44
 This 
allows a  user who is invested in the particular speech at issue to know 
about and potentially protest its removal. International agreements could, 
additionally, include an outside window for notifying users, to ensure that 
intermediaries are spurred to contact users as soon as possible, instead of 
leaving the precise time period at the discretion of individual countries. 
 
B. Counter-notice, or counter-notification. 
 
Users should have the ability to respond to claims of infringement and 
to request that an intermediary put material back up. In U.S. law, the 
intermediary must replace removed material in no less than ten, nor more 
than fourteen business days, following the receipt of the counter-notice. If 
the intermediary fails to do so, it may be liable to the user for having 
removed the material in the first place.
45
 The free trade agreements in 
question lack concrete timelines for restoring material, referring only to ―a 
reasonable time.‖ On the one hand, this may allow countries the flexibility 
to implement a shorter timeframe. On the other hand, if countries directly 
adopt the language of the free trade agreements, this allows intermediaries 
to sit on counter-notifications for a longer time, with no consequences. Note 
that the ten days of required removal time in the United States after receipt 
of the counter notice is a long time for legitimate material to remain down if 
it is, in fact, not infringing. 
                                                 
44
 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(A) (2007). 
45
 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(C). 
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C. Sanctions for knowing misrepresentation. 
  
Notice-and-takedown regimes that occur outside of a court run a strong 
risk of abuse by those people requesting takedowns, since no court must 
establish that the material is, in fact, infringing before it is taken down. To 
counter this potential for abuse, the DMCA contains a provision in Section 
512(f) that establishes liability for making material misrepresentations that 
content is infringing, when the claimant knows that it is not infringing. This 
prevents abuse of the notice-and-takedown system for other kinds of 
censorship. The proposed language in ACTA, however, failed to include 
these sanctions;
46
 free trade agreements have included them, but lack 
clarification that damages should include costs and attorneys’ fees and that 
the intermediary can also sue for damages (in addition to the user whose 
material is taken down). 
 
D. Subpoenas for user identity. 
 
Subpoenas to intermediaries that ask them to identify their users are a 
part of negotiations on intermediary liability. ACTA recommends that 
parties give officials the authority to require online service providers to 
disclose the identity of allegedly infringing users to right holders.
47
 There 
are substantial privacy and free speech concerns when accusers can obtain 
the identity of alleged infringers without due process or  adequate proof of 
infringement. If a regime does not require that a claimant show 
infringement, as a prerequisite to obtaining an Internet user’s identity, the 
accuser could ostensibly use the process to find out anybody’s identity, 
including whistleblowers or other people whose views the accuser dislikes.  
In the United States, a court standard has developed that protects the 
anonymity of speakers, in the context of defamation and other lawsuits. 
That standard requires reasonable efforts to notify the accused Internet user 
that they are about to be identified; identification of the exact actions that 
constitute an actionable cause; allegation of the cause of action and 
sufficient evidence to survive a motion for summary judgment; and a court 
judgment, balancing the right of anonymous free speech against the strength 
of the case and the necessity for disclosure of identity, in order for the 
                                                 
46
 See Margot E. Kaminski, An Overview and the Evolution of the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 385, 439 (2011). 
47
See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, art. 2.18.4, Oct. 2, 2010, Official Journal 
C 349E 46.  
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plaintiff to proceed.
48
 
The standard for an identifying subpoena in copyright law is lower and 
is, notably, in tension with the standard for anonymous speech elsewhere in 
U.S. law.
49
 U.S. copyright law contains a provision allowing content owners 
to get a subpoena to obtain a user’s identity from an intermediary without 
litigation—which means without establishing a case of infringement.50 
However, the DMCA and U.S. caselaw restrict use of this subpoena, 
through provisions that are missing from free trade agreements. First, U.S. 
courts have found that the subpoena for identifying information does not 
apply to neutral conduits, such as ISPs; these neutral conduits are excused 
from having to identify their users before a lawsuit has been filed.
51
 Second, 
the DMCA requires that, even where Section 512(h) subpoenas may be 
used, the accuser must include in its request for a subpoena a copy of an 
effective notification and a sworn declaration that ―the purpose for which 
the subpoena is sought is to obtain the identity of an alleged infringer and 
that such information will only be used for the purpose of protecting rights 
under this title.‖52 This limits potential abuse of the subpoena, by requiring 
its requestor to promise not to abuse it. 
  
E. Privacy protections. 
 
In the previous section, I discussed the necessity of including a 
provision clarifying that safe harbors should not be conditioned on 
monitoring users. U.S. law contains a second level of protection; however, 
this protection is left out of free trade agreements. Under Section 512(m)(2) 
of the DMCA, in order to avail itself of the safe harbor, an intermediary 
need not access material when that behavior is ―prohibited by law.‖53 The 
1998 U.S. Copyright Office Summary of the DMCA explained that this 
provision prevents service providers from violating U.S. wiretap law, 
thereby prioritizing privacy over copyright enforcement—in accord with the 
ECJ’s recent finding that user rights take priority over filtering for 
infringing behavior.
54
 
                                                 
48
 Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. App. 2001). 
49
 Eric Goldman, Did a Court Eliminate 512(h) Subpoenas?--Maximized Living v. 
Google, ERIC GOLDMAN (Jan. 6, 2012, 9:18 AM), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/01/did_a_court_eli.htm. 
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 17 U.S.C. § 512(h). 
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 In re Charter Communications, 393 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(C). 
53
 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(2). 
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F. Injunctions. 
  
Injunctive relief refers to a court order to the intermediary to undertake 
an action, such as blocking access to infringing material. Because injunctive 
relief can interfere with speech, the DMCA requires a court to consider four 
factors when awarding injunctive relief: the burden to the intermediary; the 
harm to the copyright owner; whether the injunction is technically feasible 
and doesn’t interfere with access to noninfringing material; and whether 
less burdensome, but equally effective responses exist.
55
 In contrast, the free 
trade agreements fail to ask courts to look to the potential combined burden 
to the intermediary from multiple injunctions. The DMCA also requires 
consideration of not only whether an injunction is technically feasible and 
effective, but also whether it will interfere with access to non-infringing 
material on other online locations. This provision is missing from the free 
trade agreements and could adversely impact sites like search engines. 
 
G. Terminating Repeat Offender Accounts. 
 
The public response to ACTA turned negative when it was revealed that 
negotiators considered including language addressing the termination of the 
accounts of repeat offenders. On its surface, this language resembles 
graduated response. Ultimately, it was not included in ACTA’s final text. 
U.S. law includes language requiring service providers to establish a 
policy for the termination of the accounts of repeat infringers.
56
 However, 
the caselaw in the United States is mixed, with regard to defining what 
constitutes a ―repeat infringer‖—whether the offense must have been found 
in court, or merely identified by the content owner.
57
 Negotiators should be 
cautious about including this language internationally, because it could 
potentially create a system whereby users can have their Internet access 
disabled, without a means to protest the disabling in court.  At least one 
country has found this to be a violation of the rights guaranteed by its 
constitution.
58
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H. Standard Technical Measures. 
 
Both U.S. law and free trade agreements contain references to ―standard 
technical measures‖ that intermediaries must accommodate.59 However, in 
the DMCA, such measures must, by law, be developed pursuant to a broad 
consensus between copyright owners and service providers, in an ―open, 
fair, voluntary, multi-industry standards process.‖60 They also must not 
impose substantial costs on service providers, or substantial burdens on 
their systems or networks.
61
 If free trade agreements are going to include 
references to standard technical measures, they must include multi-industry 
participants, or risk that such measures will be set by copyright owners 
alone. They also should include references to the costs to and burdens on 
intermediaries. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has attempted to outline both general principles and specific 
proposals for ensuring that users are protected when governments establish 
intermediary liability. Again, we should be cautious in rushing to establish 
international intermediary liability, given that diversity in the short-run may 
result in a better system down the line. However, if the question of 
standardizing intermediary liability laws it brought to the negotiating table, 
the above considerations should be taken into account.  
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